What transpired during and after the Asean-China foreign ministers' meeting last week in Yuxi, near the capital city of Kunming in Yunnan, has put a serious dent in the leading role of Asean in regional affairs. It will have far-reaching implications for regional integration if not urgently and conscientiously repaired.
In the wake of the disarray over Asean's stand on the South China Sea, both sides now bear the responsibility of winning back the confidence and trust, internally and externally, that have contributed so much to the miracle of economic growth and human progress in the region.
One of the precious achievements of Asean, now one year shy of a half century, is its "convening power". For the lack of other legitimate and recognised region-wide political, strategic and economic forum, Asean has incrementally filled the void and gradually earned the reputation as "the fulcrum of emerging architecture" of cooperation in East Asia, as Hillary Clinton put it when she served as the US secretary of state.
When Asean calls for a meeting, all regional states and those outside the region want to attend. That "convening power" was enshrined in the Asean Charter of 2007 as the "Centrality of Asean". All external powers --"dialogue partners" in the Asean lexicon -- respect this state of regional affairs "with Asean in the driver's seat". As a result, Asean has given rise to many regional forums, such as the post (foreign) ministerial meetings with dialogue partners, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec), Asean Regional Forum (ARF), Asean Plus Three and Asean Plus Six, Asean Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), Asia Europe Meeting (Asem), East Asia Summit (EAS) and the emerging Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
It has taken Asean almost a half century to reach this point. The ingenious mechanism of "dialogue partnership" is a necessary invention to give all players within and outside the region a legitimate space to articulate their aspirations, concerns, interests and vision in, for and about the region. This has burnished Asean's reputation as "a platform that threatens none but welcomes all".
Every dialogue partner has thus felt comfortable playing a role in shaping "community building" in the region. It is a slow process, often frustratingly slow, reflecting the tremendous diversity the region has to manage in its integration efforts.
One of the most difficult issues Asean faces in dealing with dialogue partners is determining which issues are collective Asean interests, and which are "bilateral" and should remain the domain of two interested parties, within Asean or with external powers. Whether it be trade, defence, security or strategic affairs, Asean has left this purposely undefined so that all members can pursue what each considers vital to its national interest. Thus, bilateral relations can be pursued on top of or within the multilateral framework. Naturally, this sometimes confuses players, partners and observers.
COLLECTIVE INTEREST
The territorial disputes over the islands, islets and shoals between China and four Asean states -- the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei -- have had their own "Asean character" since the first Declaration on the South China Sea issued in Manila in 1992, four years before China became an official dialogue partner. It states that "any adverse developments in the South China Sea directly affect peace and stability in the region". It also commends "all parties concerned to apply the principles contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as the basis for establishing a code of international conduct over the South China Sea".
(I should also point out that I was among those who have long sought to bring China and Asean closer together. In 1999, as the Thai foreign minister, I joined my Chinese counterpart, Tang Jiasuan, in signing the "Joint Communique on a Plan of Cooperation for the 21st century". Other Asean members gradually followed suit.)
Ten years after the Manila declaration, in November 2002 in Phnom Penh, the governments of China and Asean members finally agreed on a "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea", or DoC. It acknowledges "the need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment in the South China Sea between Asean and China for the enhancement of peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity in the region".
It continues: "Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes ... and to handle their differences in a constructive manner."
The declaration reaffirmed the need for a code of conduct and a joint working group was formed in December 2004 to further this effort. But it took nearly seven more years to come up with the "Guidelines for DoC" agreed to in Bali in July 2011.
The long delays reflected the disagreements over how Asean should handle its "collective approach". It wanted to reflect its own consultative approach that had characterised strategy on this critically important issue. So it insisted on saying that "Asean will continue its current practice of consulting among themselves before meeting with China".
That was not acceptable to China. Eventually, the contentious item was rephrased as follows: "The Parties to the DoC will continue to promote dialogue and consultations in accordance with the spirit of the DoC." The Guidelines were then adopted unanimously.
Understanding this background is necessary to clarify one important issue: whether the South China Sea is a "bilateral issue among claimant states" or a collective issue that Asean should pursue together.
Both sides are fully aware of the enormity of the challenge. As the fiasco of Yuxi has shown, the international community is also anxious about the "collapse", "confusion" and "disarray", and "rising maritime tensions". This does not bode well for the future of regional integration, not only of Southeast Asia, but East Asia as a whole.
REFLECTION AND RENEWAL
Because East Asia has become a new locomotive for economic growth and global recovery, all parties have a collective responsibility to step back and reflect on their future options. And there are a few viable options to focus on in order to assuage the concerns of those potentially affected by conflicts and tensions in the region.
First, Asean and China will be wise to get back on their long track of common pursuit of an amicable resolution, even temporarily, to the current spats resulting from the Yuxi incident. Their long contractual common objective is the establishment of a binding Code of Conduct. Whatever has happened along the way, this goal should not be affected.
Second, the Centrality of Asean must be restored if the region is to have any meaningful forums to explore peaceful means to avoid potential conflicts. A cardinal working principle of this region is the role of Asean in bringing together dialogue partners with heavy historical baggage in order to find areas of common interest and to avoid faultlines of potential disagreements and conflicts.
Third, Asean members themselves have to do some soul-searching on the efficacy of existing approaches to internal coordination and cooperation. It appears the Asean platform is wobbling under the stress of external relations. Greater solidarity is urgently needed to manage the rising temperature of power plays among external partners.
Fourth, the dialogue partners need to be aware that without Asean, or a diminished Asean Centrality, the region will be more difficult to manage and it will be even harder to promote and protect their individual interests. Any undue pressure or mishandling of issues may cause irreparable damage to the only "fulcrum" of power relations in the region.
As tensions rise over the South China Sea, the global community looks toward the parties concerned to find a peaceful way out for the sake of the regional peace and prosperity. As the region has become more important to the world than a decade or two ago, any sign of instability sends shivers around the world.
It is our collective responsibility to find ways to manage our differences in a manner that would inspire confidence in the future of the region. Without such global confidence, faith and engagement, the region will be robbed of its own prosperous and secure future.
China and Asean should bear this in mind as they surely must be groping for the next phase of their long search for an amicable solution to the vexing challenge of the troubled waters of the South China Sea.
Dr Surin Pitsuwan served from Jan 1, 2008 to Dec 31, 2012 as the secretary-general of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.