Justice is key to success for South dialogue

Justice is key to success for South dialogue

Last week the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra agreed to talks with Ustaz Hassan Taib from the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) to seek an end to the armed conflict in the southern border provinces, which has claimed more than 5,000 lives in the past nine years.

On the surface, the "General Consensus for Peace Dialogue Process" can be seen as an attempt by the government to blunt the separatist ideology driving the insurgency. While the move constitutes the first official government recognition of the BRN-C, which most acknowledge is the backbone of separatist groups, the document signed is also clearly bound by Thailand's constitutional framework. The 2007 Constitution sets out that Thailand's territory is indivisible. This means that separatist leaders participating in this process will be expected to give up their goal of an independent state for the ethnic Malay Muslim population in the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, as well as parts of Songkhla province. In return, the government is offering members and supporters of separatist groups to surrender in exchange for an amnesty under the Internal Security Act's plea-bargaining scheme.

The parameters of this anticipated dialogue are likely to run up against the core beliefs of the insurgents. Guided by a combination of extremist ethnic Malay nationalism and Islamist ideologies, the Patani Independence Fighters (Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani), militants in the BRN-C's network, have asserted that the southern border provinces be liberated by force from ethnic Thai Buddhists to create what they call the Islamic Land of Patani (Patani Darusalam). Part of that strategy has meant not tolerating the presence of ethnic Thai Buddhists, who have increasingly been targeted by insurgents.

Separatist militants use violence against civilians to scare ethnic Thai Buddhists away, to keep ethnic Malay Muslims under control, and to discredit the authorities. Tactics used by insurgents in the southern border provinces include reprisal attacks against civilians and captured combatants, summary execution of civilians or captured combatants, mutilation or other mistreatment of the dead. They also include attacks directed at civilian structures such as homes, schools, temples, community clinics, hotels, restaurants, and markets. Insurgents adopt interpretations of Islamic law and nationalist ideologies to seek to justify their actions. But such deliberate attacks on civilians are war crimes.

But serious abuses are hardly a monopoly of insurgents. Thai government officials have much to answer for as well. Despite the brutality of insurgent tactics, the authorities have continually failed to win the hearts and minds of ethnic Malay Muslims _ and a major reason why is their failure to hold accountable members of security units who abuse civilians.

The government's counter-insurgency campaigns have countenanced serious human rights violations, such as extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and torture. Officials in regular and volunteer security units have also responded to insurgent attacks by engaging in tit-for-tat retaliation against ethnic Malay Muslim civilians. Abuses by security forces have been met in-kind by insurgents, and the escalation of atrocities has widened communal gaps between the Thai Buddhist and ethnic Malay Muslim communities.

A new generation of insurgents has been hardened by what they see as Thai government officials' endless string of abuses against ethnic Malay Muslims. An examination of the lives of prominent militants _ such as Maroso Chantrawadee, Suhaidi Dahay, and Hasem Bueraheng _ shows how government abuses played a critical role in transforming young idealists into aggrieved, ruthless militants.

Back on Oct 25, 2004, all three were among the over 1,000 peaceful protesters arrested by security forces in a violent crackdown in Narathiwat's Tak Bai district. Security forces shot seven protesters dead. They then arrested scores more, packed them in layers on top of each other in army trucks, and drove them for hours to an army barracks in Pattani. The brutality and negligence of those soldiers resulted in 78 protesters dying of suffocation in the trucks. To date, not a single member of the security forces has faced criminal prosecution for what happened on that day. Maroso and his friends said the anger and pain drove them to take up arms and seek retribution for the sufferings and injustice inflicted at Tak Bai.

Stories of abuses by officials and a total lack of accountability can be heard in many ethnic Malay Muslim villages across the southern border provinces. These narratives, and the anger they generate, serve as fertile soil for the Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani militants to grow.

By signing the agreement in Kuala Lumpur, the Yingluck government has signalled a new approach to the crisis in the southern border provinces. It may take months or even years for dialogue to yield any tangible results. But without a strong commitment to address root causes of ethnic Malay Muslims' grievances, specifically the lack of accountability for the government's human rights abuses and injustice that galvanise and radicalise the insurgency, peace efforts may founder.

Necessary trust has to be built with the ethnic Malay Muslim population for a productive dialogue to take place. By taking concrete action to end state-sanctioned abuses and the culture of impunity, the authorities can kick-start this process.


Sunai Phasuk is a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch.

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