One morning last week I drove out of my soi onto Witthayu Road. Making a U-turn in front of Lumpini park I was stopped by a People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) guard on a motorbike. Other guards on motorbikes stopped traffic on all sides.
Then, pouring out of Lumpini park’s main gate, came the PDRC convoy. One youngster on a motorbike broke through the line, cursed at the PDRC guards and drove off. They let him go, paying no mind.
It took about 10 to 15 minutes until traffic flow resumed. All the of this occurred right in front of a police station.
Naturally, the question that popped into mind was: “Who’s in charge here?” The same question was raised during the red-shirt United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship’s occupation of the area some four years ago.
Where are state authorities? Does the state have any authority left? Should Thailand be considered a failed state? The fiasco described certainly strengthens the case that it should.
There is no definitive consensus on what constitutes a failed state, but let’s consider this one. Washington-based NGO Fund for Peace outlined the following characteristics associated with failed states.
One: Loss of control of territory, or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force therein. Two: Erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions. Three: Inability to provide public services. Four: Inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.
On the first characteristic — discounting the area surrounding the Phreah Vihear temple — the conflict in the southern provinces of Songkhla, Yala and Narathiwat makes for a good argument. It is still Thai soil and under military rule, but we don’t have much control over it either.
For a government to maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within its borders, the police and military must be in charge, as opposed to warlords, paramilitary or terrorist groups.
In this respect, Thailand can be considered a failed state, and has been for years. Rival political groups have proven they can take over the streets of the capital. Not to the mention the storming of various government buildings.
The caretaker Pheu Thai government has control of the police force, but an uneasy relationship with the military. The police force however has little control over the capital, and is sharing security duties with the military.
Before that, the Democrat government had an uneasy relationship with the police force, but a collaborative relationship with the military. When physical force was necessary, the military had to be brought in.
Neither example speaks much for state monopoly on physical force.
In fact, no civilian Thai government has ever had monopoly on physical force, because the military has always been a power unto itself and can interfere with domestic politics at any time, through a loud or a silent coup.
The second characteristic is the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions. Currently, Thailand does fit the description. There is no centralised authority to make collective decisions. Especially not in parliament. In fact, there isn’t a parliament. Meanwhile, the caretaker prime minister and cabinet face impeachment.
Different state agencies are at odds with each other, accusing each other of siding with Pheu Thai or the PDRC.
On the third characteristic, Thailand still has the ability to provide public services, however poorly. Rubbish is picked up. Water and electricity work. Public buses still run, like maniacs as usual.
The fourth characteristic is the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.
Our diplomatic ties and trade continue, but new agreements can’t be signed.
This goes back to the second characteristic; Thailand currently doesn’t have the authority to make collective decisions, so interacting with other states becomes problematic.
Of the four characteristics, it seems Thailand is only a functioning state in so far as providing public services. We may not be entirely failed in everything else, but we definitely fail to function to full capacity.
At the same time, there’s a school of thought that says the concept of a failed state is incoherent and merely serves the policy goals of Western countries to intervene in other states. But it makes for an interesting intellectual exercise.
Thailand may not be in the league of Somalia or the likes. But it’s good to know where we are at, how we came to be here and what the future may hold.
Email Voranai Vanijaka at voranai@gmail.com.