Post-reunification vision key to North negotiations

Post-reunification vision key to North negotiations

As South Korean President Park Geun-hye visits Washington, much attention will be focused on the ability of the two nations to craft a joint strategy for dealing with North Korea.

It's important that they do so, but it's even more important for South Korea and the United States to develop a forward-thinking joint vision for the alliance relationship.

They already have a "Joint Vision Statement" crafted by Mr Obama and former South Korean President Lee Myung-bak during Mr Lee's visit to Washington in June 2009.

The two leaders need to build upon that vision statement while addressing three key points _ the future role of the alliance post-reunification; the respective South Korean and US roles when it comes to both denuclearisation and the broader issue of Korean Peninsula peace and stability; and the identification of mid-term goals that would (or at least should) be acceptable to Pyongyang in charting a future path.

What is the long-term vision for the alliance? Is it merely to deal with the North Korean threat, or does it have a role in promoting and preserving regional stability once the North Korea issue is resolved?

A failure to articulate the alliance's post-reunification role has direct relevance to how one deals with North Korea today, since Pyongyang has made no secret of its view that Washington's continued alliance with Seoul and the resultant continued presence of US forces in the South constitute "proof" that the US maintains a "hostile policy" toward the North.

Removing US forces from the South and closing the US nuclear umbrella remain transparent North Korean goals. The two allies need to constantly remind Pyongyang that the future of the alliance is for South Korea and the US alone to decide. It should not become a bargaining chip in either US or South Korean negotiations with Pyongyang.

The second item the two leaders need to tackle is an articulation and validation of Seoul's leading role in determining the peninsula's future and America's commitment to this approach, despite the apparent necessity of Washington serving as a "lead negotiator" when it comes to the specific topic of denuclearisation.

Today, Washington appears to be sending mixed messages. Many Korean officials and experts believe Washington wants the Park administration to take the lead in denuclearisation discussions. Others (and most US officials I talk to) are not so sure. The two sides need to be clear about their desired division of labour when it comes to dealing with Pyongyang.

One of the North's long-standing and constantly demonstrated objectives is to marginalise or delegitimise the South. This led the Bill Clinton and Kim Young-sam administrations, in 1996, to affirm "the fundamental principle that establishment of a stable, permanent peace on the Korean peninsula is the task of the Korean people" and that "South and North Korea should take the lead in a renewed search for a permanent peace arrangement".

Presidents Obama and Park need to reaffirm this pledge.

This does not negate a direct role for Washington in denuclearisation and nonproliferation discussions with Pyongyang, however. On the contrary, it could help put such bilateral talks in the broader context of not just the Six-Party Talks but the future peace and stability of the Korean peninsula as well.

The South Korean government and people would be less concerned about direct dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang if they were more assured that its focus was limited to nonproliferation and denuclearisation issues and that broader issues _ including US force structure or the future of the alliance _ were not on the table.

On the other hand, for political as well as for security reasons, the South Korean government cannot allow itself to be, or even appear to be, marginalised or too far removed from the centre of discussions dealing with security on the peninsula. Pyongyang continues to insist on a bilateral peace accord between the US and North Korea. The two presidents need to make it clear that this is not going to happen.

The two leaders also need to identify a mid-term goal or approach that would not alienate Pyongyang but lay the groundwork for positive cooperation and eventual denuclearisation. It's one thing to be firm in dealing with North Korea. It's another to leave the North with no option other than capitulation.

If you ask 10 North Korea-watchers a question regarding Pyongyang's motives or tactics, you are likely to get 12 different answers. But if you ask what is Pyongyang's overriding objective, you are likely to get the same answer _ regime survival.

One of former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's major contributions to the North-South debate was his decision, through his "Sunshine Policy", to set reunification aside in return for an unspecified period of what amounts to peaceful co-existence (though that term was seldom if ever used).

This de facto "two Koreas" solution was also implied in Lee Myung-bak's "Grand Bargain" _ his proposal to Pyongyang offering a comprehensive economic assistance package in return for denuclearisation and constructive South-North dialogue. But his approach came across as too condescending and was soundly rejected by Pyongyang (which eagerly takes Seoul's handouts when they are called something else).

A new Grand Bargain is needed today in the form of a "Mini-Marshall Plan". Presidents Lee and Obama need to develop a joint South Korea-US package deal that offers eventual recognition and acceptance within the international community, plus economic and developmental assistance in return for denuclearisation and the North's willingness to develop and adopt a "peaceful coexistence" framework.

Such a framework would allow both sides to continue to profess their long-term goal (with different interpretations) of reunification but officially recognise one another's independent sovereignty. This would go to the heart of Pyongyang's central concern about regime survival.

The brutality of the Pyongyang regime makes this a bitter pill for some to swallow, but failing to deal with the North Korea that fate or history has dealt us is not going to move us closer to reaching our near- or long-term objectives.

The critical issue is timing.

Normalisation of relations between Pyongyang and either Washington or Seoul cannot and should not happen with a nuclear weapon-equipped North.

Both countries repeatedly assert that "under no circumstance are we going to allow North Korea to possess nuclear weapons", but in practical terms, what does this mean? Since North Korea has already declared and demonstrated at least a rudimentary nuclear-weapon capability and no one is marching on Pyongyang, the international community writ large has de facto accepted this situation at least temporarily.

It might make more sense to state that North Korea's nuclear status will never be accepted or formally recognised and that normalisation of relations and the lifting of sanctions are contingent on denuclearisation.

North Korea's "divide and conquer" tactics require a closely coordinated approach on the part of Washington and Seoul at a minimum and ideally among Tokyo, Beijing and Moscow as well.

While getting the others (and especially the Chinese) to always agree may be a bridge too far, it is essential at a minimum that Washington and Seoul continue to see _ and be seen as seeing _ eye to eye.

It's up to the two presidents to set the tone. This would demonstrate to Pyongyang, and to the American and South Korean people, that close coordination and cooperation truly exists and is a top priority for both countries as they jointly build an alliance relationship, today and post-reunification.


Ralph A Cossa is the president of Pacific Forum CSIS. The article originally appeared in the Pacific Forum CSIS Pacnet series.

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