Jokowi’s win saves democratisation
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Jokowi’s win saves democratisation

Many years from now when we look back at the fate of democracy and regionalism in Southeast Asia, the election victory of Indonesia’s President-elect Joko “Jokowi” Widodo is likely to be seen as pivotal.

An opposing win by his opponent, Prabowo Subianto would have returned Indonesia more to its yesteryear, characterised by shades of authoritarianism even with a popular mandate. Instead, Jokowi is a breath of fresh air not just for Indonesia’s future but also for the region’s democratic prospects and Asean’s forward momentum.

If we plot development trajectories on graphs, they would show upward-sloping social, economic and technological patterns over time. Societies tend to become more humane and organised, economies expand in size, and technologies improve inexorably. But when it comes to political development, the graph can be a sine curve over the millennia, moving up and down between democracy and dictatorship, between the rule of the few versus the majority.

Development trajectories are all going up in different ways in Southeast Asia. Its economies are generally expanding, its societies more sophisticated, industrialised, globalised and connected within and across by media technologies. Its polities are mixed and diverse, ranging from absolute monarchy and electoral democracies to communist-party rule. The balance of regime types has been tipping in favour of more authoritarianism and less democracy. Thailand’s recent military intervention is a case in point, but Cambodia, Malaysia and Myanmar have exhibited signs of regression.

Much was thus riding on Indonesia, the largest Muslim country and the third-largest democracy in the world, a very young democracy of 16 years that has seen mostly colonialism and military authoritarianism in its nationhood.

The contrast between Jokowi and Mr Prabowo was stark, the former from humble beginnings who made himself into a successful furniture-exporting businessman and effective governor of Jakarta, the latter a former army general in charge of special forces and son-in-law of the late President Suharto.

Jokowi ran on reform and progress. His persona signified hope and a better democratic future, whereas Mr Prabowo offered decisiveness and strongman charisma and instincts, relying and capitalising on what was good about the past. It was a close race, with around a 53-47 margin.

Myriad post-mortem analyses of the Indonesia’s presidential election will emerge, but what is crucial to note at this point is the strength of the country’s democratic institutions. Like all countries, Indonesia has its fair share of scandals and intrigues, such as a conviction of the former head of the Constitutional Court and a life sentence. But this election has seen a high turnout of more than 70% in an archipelagic terrain with far-flung islands. The election was free and fair, unmarred by violence.

Most important in any decent democratic contest is that the winner has to be allowed to rule until the people decide otherwise and the loser has to accept defeat without endless remonstration.

Although Mr Prabowo has protested, some of his coalition allies have thrown in the towel, particularly outgoing President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The controversy over the “quick” post-poll vote counts and the final tally by the General Election Commission may reach the Constitutional Court, but it is hard now to deny a Jokowi presidency. Indonesia’s democracy is consolidating incrementally. Its electorate participates in elections and stands by the results. Its institutions of accountability stand by the electorate.

Jokowi faces many challenges as Indonesia is not Jakarta. Expectations are running high after Mr Yudhoyono’s perceived ineffectual leadership. The new president will have to form a capable cabinet. He will need a team of credible policy professionals at the foreign ministry to maintain Indonesia’s role in the G-20 and to provide thrust for Asean. Mr Yudhoyono set a fine example for Indonesia’s global standing, having assembled a technocratic team around Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa.

The president-elect, who will be Indonesia’s first leader unrelated to its authoritarian past, will also need to emerge into his own away from the shadows of his Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI-P) matriarch, former president Megawati Sukarnoputri.

If Jokowi can last a full term and Indonesia can usher in another steady presidential changeover, the prospect of its democratic consolidation will be exemplary to Southeast Asian democracies, indirectly imposing parameters on democratic reversals by the force of example.

By coincidence, Cambodia’s problematic election results from July 2013 have been resolved by compromise that will allow its national assembly to convene in full. This is the right direction for Cambodia’s fledgling electoral democracy to take. It just has to become less authoritarian in practice prior to the next election, and its opposition party has to offer viable leadership and attractive policy programmes in the interim.

Myanmar and Thailand are the next test cases. Both are set for elections next year. Myanmar’s leadership contest is fierce, weighed down by communal and religious violence and beset with growing restrictions on freedom of expression and violations of human rights.

Currently under a military government, Thailand remains stuck in its cycle of coups, constitutions, and elections. It is supposed to end up with a better democracy after its latest military coup.

Ironically, Thailand is more similar to Myanmar these days than to Indonesia, even though Indonesia used to emulate Thailand just 16 years ago.

All democracies in Southeast Asia have their defects. Indonesia’s is the finest that can be seen in the region at this time.

Jokowi’s victory will provide Asean with a regional leadership as the 47-year-old organisation moves into its ambitious phase under the Asean Community plans.

It is also a big boon for democratisation in this neighbourhood.

Had Indonesian democracy gone out the window with a Jokowi defeat, it would have been a setback for regional democratisation.

In a long view, Jokowi’s triumph may have saved the future of democracy in Southeast Asia.


Thitinan Pongsudhirak is associate professor and director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak

Senior fellow of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University

A professor and senior fellow of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Political Science, he earned a PhD from the London School of Economics with a top dissertation prize in 2002. Recognised for excellence in opinion writing from Society of Publishers in Asia, his views and articles have been published widely by local and international media.

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