During the Indochina War years from the 1950s through to the 1970s, America's seven military bases in Thailand symbolised the extraordinary extent of US influence over the politics and development of the Kingdom. In the subsequent 30 years, American influence in Thailand has slowly but steadily waned, largely supplanted by a rising China. Thailand, which had been a linchpin of America's Asian strategy, is now instead a linchpin of China's Asian strategy. American soldiers on R&R have been replaced by Chinese tourists, American airbases by plans for Chinese high-speed rail links. China, not the US, is now Thailand's largest trading partner.
Thailand: Shifting Ground Between The US And A Rising China. By Benjamin ZawackiThe University of Chicago Press
In the rivalry for Asian regional influence between the US and China, countries so different from each other in culture, geographic endowment, and political economy, Thailand occupies a pivotal position. Benjamin Zawacki tells the story of the trilateral relationship between Thailand, the US and China since World War II in Thailand: Shifting Ground Between The US And A Rising China.
In the first four decades since the war, the US had an enormous stake in Thailand as a potential "falling domino" with neighbouring Indochina. It poured resources into the country, provided huge military assistance to the Thai army, and enjoyed close personal relations at the highest levels in the Thai government and military. Thailand sided with the US in the Cold War, sending military detachments to fight alongside US soldiers in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
Zawacki describes how the end of the Indochina Wars greatly reduced the geostrategic importance of Thailand in the eyes of Washington, just as China was emerging from self-imposed isolation and seeking robust relationships with neighbouring states, chief among them Thailand. Zawacki chronicles in detail the US loss of influence to China over the next 30 years in what he describes as a "zero sum" game -- China's gain is America's loss.
In China's newly outward looking strategy, Thailand is a priority state for several reasons, among them the fact that southern Thailand faces the narrow Strait of Malacca through which pass half the world's maritime vessels and almost all of China's energy imports. Building a canal across southern Thailand's Isthmus of Kra would be a potential shortcut for China's maritime trade to escape the US navy's control over the Strait of Malacca. China has more at stake in Thailand than did post-Vietnam War America.
As Zawacki tells the story, over the past decade, US attention has focused on the Middle East and the War on Terror. Coups in 2006 and 2014 each briefly recaptured the attention of Washington, but Zawacki describes America's reaction to the coups as "too much rhetoric for too few results". He describes Obama's "Pivot to Asia" as "boldly pledging motion before standing still". The high level of Thailand-area knowledge and close personal relationships developed during the war in Indochina between US diplomats and military officers with their Thai counterparts atrophied -- the last real "Thai hand" in the embassy was Skip Boyce, who was ambassador to Thailand from 2005-2007.
The reader is sometimes overwhelmed by the exhaustive narration of Thai arms deals with the US and China, official visits to Washington and Beijing, and other details of Thailand's evolving relationships with the two giants. But the level of detail reflects Zawacki's thorough research into his subject, not only looking through publicly available documents, but also conducting extensive interviews with Thais and Americans (but few with the Chinese). Interviews with well-placed Thais reveal frustration with a lack of support and understanding from Americans and exasperation with America's vacillating approach to Thailand. They also reveal Thais' grudging appreciation for China's steadfast support and clarity of strategy.
Thailand: Shifting Ground is an excellent contribution to understanding American and Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia. It is not only a narration of modern Thailand's key international relationships, but also a case study of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era and of China's growing foreign policy aggressiveness and astuteness. America's value-based foreign policy, lacking sensitivity to Thailand's situation, contrasts with the clarity of long-term interests that China brings to its dealings with Thailand. In analysing the impetus for Thai, Chinese and US strategic approaches to Thailand, and in making his case for what the US must do to advance its strategy, Zawacki is at his most eloquent. A clear imperative for an overhaul in US formulation of foreign policy emerges from the pages.
Zawacki occasionally expresses dismay at what he sees as bungled US policy towards Thailand, particularly over the past decade, and US inability to recognise early on the continued importance of Thailand to an overall US strategy for maintaining its position in the Asia-Pacific region. The result is inconsistent policy, and loss of US credibility in the eyes of Thais. Zawacki concludes that "the US has 'lost' Thailand more than China has gained it".
In the forward and in the final sentences of the book, Zawacki asserts his voice as an American who believes in liberal democracy. Despite America's bungled message delivery and policy implementation, in the concluding chapter the author states emphatically that "the US is right: a solution will come, in Thailand as elsewhere, when the US decides to consistently treat democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as national interests -- not merely perceive or proclaim them as such, but invest strategic resources toward their protection and advancement".
Zawacki acknowledges that Thais have in recent years demonstrated "a clear preference to rule and be ruled rather than to represent and be represented". Not all will agree with this statement, but the reader wishes that the author had explored this point further. If Zawacki is correct, what are the implications for the success or failure of American policies towards Thailand, both in recent years and in the future? This is the cultural aspect of relationships between nations.
In seeing the game in Thailand between the two global powers as "zero sum", and maintaining that the US must continue to stand for democratic rule and human rights, while improving the delivery of the democratic message and the effectiveness of its engagement with governments like Thailand, has Zawacki overlooked the possibility that a different approach by the US towards Thailand might avoid the "zero sum" trap, which seems to work only to the advantage of China? In his book, The China Choice, noted Australian strategic thinker Hugh White argues that "the best way for America to respond to China's growing power is to agree with China to share the leadership of Asia".
With the exception of the Vietnam War period, Thais have over the past two centuries been adept at balancing the influence of foreign powers in their own interest. Following White's reasoning, might a more empathetic and sensitive American engagement with Thailand provide space for Thais to accommodate both American and Chinese interests in Thailand, making the game "win-win" for all rather than "zero sum"? That would certainly be in Thailand's own best interests, and most likely America's as well.
Hopefully careful reading of the lessons of Thailand: Shifting Ground can lay the basis for new American engagement with Thailand, both more sensitive and more effective. And perhaps also American engagement with other Asian nations as well.
James Stent is a long-time American resident of Thailand and China, and author of China's Banking Transformation: The Untold Story.
Thailand: Shifting Ground Between The US And A Rising China.
By Benjamin Zawacki
The University of Chicago Press
